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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND CRIMINAL LAW
Abstract: The ongoing expansion of federal criminal law undermines
the historical decentralization of criminal law in this country by
usurping state authority in that area. While some protection of
federalism is necessitated by the Supreme Court's commerce power
jurisprudence, the economic/non-economic distinction enunciated in
United States v. Lopez is an unworkable return to past efforts to find
internal limits to the Commerce Clause. Instead, a return to the test of
National League of Cities v. Usery---yiewing the Tenth Amendment as an
external limit on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority—
is the best means of protecting the authority of the states to make and
enforce criminal law.
INTRODUCTION
It has been five years since the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced in United States v. Lopez that an outer limit to Congress's
Commerce Clause power to enact criminal law exists, and that the
Court would police that limit) Though not in the context of a crimi-
nal prosecution, a majority of the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
their commitment to policing that limit in United States v. Morrison,
stating that "Mlle Constitution requires a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local." 2
In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Souter rejected the Court's rea-
soning in both that case and Lopez, stating that "today's ebb of the
commerce power rests on error." 3 The lower courts appear to agree
with Justice Souter; in the five years since the Supreme Court an-
nounced its decision in Lopez, lower courts have deferred to Congress
in holding federal criminal statutes and their application to local
crime constitutional in almost every instance. 4 In the face of contin-
1 See id. at 556-57, 561.
2 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2000).
5 Id. at 1773 (Sower, J., dissenting).
4 Between 1995 and 1999, 618 cases died Lopez with regard to the validity of federal
criminal legislation (result of Westlaw KeyCite search of cases citing Lopez headnote related
to federalism); see also William Funk, The Lopez Report, 23 AnmtN. & REG. L. NEWS I, 14
(1998) (as of the stunner of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges made to federal statutes,
only three had been upheld).
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ued judicial deference to Congressional assertions of Commerce
Clause authority, commentators have been emboldened to proclaim
that federal courts are not likely to invalidate many federal laws under
Lopez, nor is the Suprethe Court likely to expand its scope. 5
At least one Circuit Court of Appeals has reached an impasse on
the issue. 6 After meeting en banc, the Fifth Circuit split evenly, eight to
eight, as to whether the federal government could use the Hobbs Act
to reach a group of local thugs who robbed franchises of national
corporations in their area including Subway Sandwiches, Church's
Chicken, AutoZone Auto Parts, Dairy Queen and Hardee's. 7 Although
the split served to uphold the conviction, the dissent in that case ex-
posed the doctrinal differences that continue to perplex courts across
the country. 8 Bound by that en Banc ruling, less than a week later the
Fifth Circuit upheld the Hobbs Act conviction of a man who robbed a
local Ace Hardware store, part of a national chain. 9 In a special con-
currence, however, one judge on the panel observed that Is]ooner
or later the Supreme Court must either back down from the princi-
ples enunciated in Lopez or rule that the Hobbs Act cannot be consti-
tutionally applied to local robberies.")
If Lopez and Morrison do stand for meaningful limits OIL Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power, the Supreme Court must definitively
locate those limits to guide lower courts in their analysis of federal
statutes and their application." This Note will argue that some protec-
tion of federalism is necessitated by the Supreme Court's commerce
power jurisprudence, which has gradually expanded the Commerce
Clause from a limited, enumerated power to one of breathtaking
sweep. 12
 The economic/non-economic distinction enunciated in Lo-
5 See, e.g., 14. Geoffrey Moulton, The Quixotic Search fora Judicially Enforceable Federalism,
83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 924 (1999) ("While the framers did envision judicial review of feder-
alism issues, the mechanism of such review was keeping Congress to its enumerated pow:
ers, which, as a result of technological changes beyond the framers' imagination, have
appropriately expanded to something close to a general police power"); Deborah Jones
Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Micir. L. Rev. 674, 728-29 (1995) rile Supreme Court sprinkled
its 1994 Term with repeated clues that the Court does not intend further dramatic cuts in
Congress's Commerce Clause power.").
6 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
9 See United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3(1 182, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1999).
10 Id. at 190 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
11 Cf. George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? Mail Fraud, State Law and
Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL. L. Ray. 225, 259-60 (1997).
12 See infra notes 16-76 and accompanying text.
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pez and Morrison, however, is an unworkable return to past efforts to
find internal limits to the Commerce Clause." With the erosion of
structural safeguards that preserve the values of federalism, a return
to the test first enunciated in 1976 in National League of Cities v. Usery-
viewing the Tenth Amendment as an external limit on the scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause authority—is the best means of protect-
ing the states' traditional police power.m In addition to recognizing
the historical primacy of the states in enforcing criminal law, this re-
turn would bolster the power of the people in their states to hold state
and federal law enforcement officials accountable by imposing a re-
quirement that the state acquiesce in federal criminal prosecutions
within their jurisdiction in subject areas traditionally policed by the
states. 15
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: FROM GIBBONS V. OGDEN TO
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
The Constitution empowers Congress "No regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the In-
dian tribes."" Indeed, when the Founders convened at the Constitu-
tional Convention in the spring of 1787, they met expressly "to take
into consideration the trade and commerce of the United States." 17
The Articles of Confederation, which loosely bound the former Eng-
lish colonies, had proven ineffectual, and the need for a coordinated,
national connnercial policy was clear." Madison addressed the scope
of Congress's power to regulate commerce between the states only
briefly in The Federalist, arguing that the power was necessary to give
effect to Congressional authority to regulate commerce with foreign
nations." He concluded unremarkably that It] he regulation of
commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition
which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are enter-
tained."2°
See infra notes 37-49, 68-73 and accompanying text.
14 See 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), ()omitted by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also infra notes 77-132 and accompanying (ext.
15 See infra notes 133-236 and accompanying text.
16 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17 CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, ,MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 9 (1966) (citing the 1786
report of the Annapolis Commission to the:Continental Congress).
18 See id. at 941.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at. 213-14 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
28 Id. at 236.
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on State Power
In Gibbons v. Ogden, in 1824, the Supreme Court took up the
question of the reach of the Commerce Clause." In that case, the
holder of a license from the State of New York to operate steam ves-
sels sought to enjoin a competing steam ship operator who ran a simi-
lar service between New Jersey and New York. 22 The New York license
granted the holder exclusive rights to navigate the waters of the state,
while the competing steam ship operator had received a federal li-
cense under a Congressional act regulating the coasting trade and
fisheries."
Describing Congress's commerce power with "a breadth never yet
exceeded,"24
 Chief Justice Marshall observed that:
This power [i.e., the Commerce Clause], like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitation, other
than are prescribed in the constitution . If, as has always
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though lim-
ited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the
power over commerce ... is vested in Congress as absolutely
as it would be in a single government. 25
In a complex federal system, Chief Justice Marshall observed, contests
for power mtist inevitably arise. 26 The Constitution is not silent on this
issue, however, providing that "[t]his constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be
the supreme law of the land." 27
 Chief Justice Marshall concluded that,
despite the lack of any explicit overriding Congressional legislation,
the very grant to Congress of the authority to pass such legislation
rendered the New York license invalid. 28
The reach of this "Dormant Commerce Clause," though broad,
was not without limits, according to Chief Justice Marshall: "The
enumeration [of the commerce power] presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something ... must be the exclusively internal
21
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
22
 See id. at 1-2.
23 See id.
24
 Wickard Fillmtrn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
25 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196-97.
26 See id. at 204-05.
27 U.S. CoNs.r. art. VI.
28 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210.
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commerce of a State."29 The reach of the federal power to regulate
commerce, Chief Justice Marshall warned, is largely a political ques-
tion, in that "Whe wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity
with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections, are, in this, as in may other instances ... the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse."3°
The modern formulation of the Dormant Commerce Clause is
exemplified by cases such as Pike v. Bruce Church, in which the Su-
preme Court considered the reach of an Arizona statute that prohib-
ited a company from shipping tmcrated cantaloupes across the state
line to a nearby packing facility in California. 31 In that case, in 1970,
the Court applied a balancing test that weighed the legitimate local
public interest protected by the Arizona statute against the burden
the statute imposed on interstate commerce." The Court acknowl-
edged the state's interest in a maintaining its reputation for high-
quality produce, and held the statute a constitutional regulation of
intrastate commerce as applied to Arizona growers who packaged
their produce in-state." Nevertheless, the Court held that as applied
to a company that maintained its own packing facility in California, a
mere thirty-one miles away from the farm in Arizona, the statute un-
constitutionally interfered with interstate commerce." Because the
company did not identify its cantaloupes as Arizona produce, the
Court found only slight state interest in forcing the company to com-
ply with Arizona regulations." That interest proved insufficient when
weighed against the requirement that the company spend $200,000 to
move at least part of its packing operations from California to Ad-
zona. 36
B. The Commerce Clause as a Limit on Federal Power
For nearly a century after the Court decided Gibbons, the Su-
preme Court rarely considered the extent of Congress's Commerce
29 See id. at 194-95.
3° Id.
51 See 397 U.S. 137, 139 (1970).
" See id. at 142.
33 See id. at 143.
See id. at 139, 144-45.
35 See id. at 144.
36 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145.
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Clause authority. 57 As Congress enacted increasingly comprehensive
regulatory schemes in the latter part of the nineteenth century and
early twentieth century, however, the Court was drawn into the strug-
gle between states and the federal government over this issue. s8 The
Court frequently invalidated these measures as exceeding Congress's
authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. 39 In so doing, the
Court relied upon a confused jurisprudence that at first focused on
the distinction between "production" or "manufacture" and "corn-
merce,"49 and later focused on the "direct" or "indirect" effects a par-
ticular activity had on interstate commerce. 41 This state of confusion
continued as the nation sank deeper into economic depression dur-
ing the early 1930s, and the Court drew increasing fire as it invali-
dated Congress's New Deal economic legislation. 42
Angered by the Court's intransigence, President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt plotted to pack the Court with six new members, justices who
would be sympathetic to New Deal reforms.* Though President Roo-
sevelt proved unsuccessful, the Court nevertheless obliged him with
the famous "switch in time that saved nine."44 In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel, in 1937, the Court sustained federal labor laws that
regulated manufacturing facilities.* Rejecting its previous inquiry
37 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-52 (citations omitted) (noting limited
inquiry by Court into extent of commerce power); see- also id. at 568-69 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (same).
se See id. at 554 (citing, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
" See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308-09 (1936) (striking down fed-
eral regulation of coal industry); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 546, 550 (1935) (striking down federal regulation of poultry industry); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (striking down federal regulation of child labor). But
see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491, 496 (1917) (upholding federal pro-
hibition on transportation of women in interstate commerce for purposes of debauchery);
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 352-53, 354 (1903) (upholding federal prohibition on
interstate sale of lottery tickets); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1888) (upholding
state regulation of liquor manufactured for later sale in interstate commerce).
40 See, e.g., Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 272 (stating that production of articles using child la-
bor is a matter of local, rather titan national, regulation); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20 (noting dis-
tinction between manufacture§ and commerce).
41 See, e.g., Carlo; 298 U.S. at 308-09 (slating that effects of labor strikes on interstate
commerce are indirect); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 546 (observing that
"there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects.").
42 See, e.g., Carte); 298 U.S. at 309; A.L.A. Schechter Potthry Corp., 295 U.S. at 550. See gen-
erally C. HERMAN PRrrcurrr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY int JuoiciAt. POLITICS AND
VALUES 1937-1947, at 7-9 (1963).
43 See genet-ally PRITCFIETT, .supra note 42, at 7-9.
44 See id.
45 See 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
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into the direct and indirect effects of a regulated activity, the Court
observed that the distinction between interstate commerce, which
Congress might legitimately, regulate, and intrastate commerce, which
Congress could not reach, "is necessarily one of degree. "46 The Court
added that despite the distinction in past cases between manufacture
and commerce, a stoppage of steel production because of labor strife
would have a serious impact on interstate commerce. 47
 The Court de-
ferred to Congress's judgment, concluding that "interstate commerce
itself is a practical conception. . . .[I]nterferences with that commerce
must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experi-
ence."48 That case was followed by other decisions equally deferential
to Congressional judgment as to whether an activity's interstate effect
was sufficient to merit federal regulation. 49
That deference continued for more than fifty years, and the
Commerce Clause came to be viewed as a national power with almost
no limit.50 In United States v. Lopez, in 1995, however, the Supreme
Court announced that an outer limit to Congress's Commerce Clause
power exists, and that the Court would police that limit. 51 In that case,
the Court struck clown the conviction of a boy who brought a hand-
gun to school, holding that the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
exceeded Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause.52 The Court identified three broad categories that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power: (1) the use of channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, as well as persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3)
activities which have a substantial relation to interstate commerce."
Finding that possession of a gun in a school zone did not fall within
either of the first two categories, the Court considered whether Con-
46 SIT id. at 37.
47 See id. at 41.
48 M. at 41-42.
49 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111. 128-29 (1942) (deferring to Congres-
sigma] determination that wheat consumption would, in the aggregate, have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109, 116-17 (1941).
(deferring to Congressional determination that goods produced through substandard
labor conditions shotdd be barred from interstate commerce).
6(' See e.g., Merritt, supra note 5, at 674. But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 842 (1976). overruled & Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. "Fransii Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (imposing external limit on Commerce Clause through Tenth Amendment); see
also infra notes 83-132 and accompanying text.
51 Seer)! 4 U.S. at 556-57, 561.
52 See id. at 552.
53 See id. at 558-59.
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gress could legitimately regulate gun possession as an activity which
had a substantial relation to interstate commerce."
As to that third category, the Court acknowledged that the case
law was unclear as to whether an activity must "affect" or "substantially
affect" commerce in order to be within Congress's reach under the
Commerce Clause. 55 The Court concluded that the proper test re-
quires that the regulated activity "substantially affect" commerce."
Reviewing past cases, the Court further held that "[w]here economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
that activity will be sustained." 57 The Court cited examples including
efforts to regulate intrastate extortionate credit transactions, as well as
actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that relied upon restaurants
utilizing substantial interstate supplies, or inns and hotels catering to
interstate guests, as permissible targets of legislation because of their
economic nature, 58
By contrast, the Court continued, the Gun-Free School Zones Act
was a criminal statute which had nothing to do with commerce, or any
sort of economic enterprise." Although the Court observed that the
"Es] tates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law," it did not invalidate the Gun-Free School Zones Act on
those grounds." Instead, the traditional nature of criminal law as an
area of state responsibility served to indicate the non-economic na-
ture of gun possession. 61 The Gun-Free School Zones Act therefore
could not be sustained under Congress's power to regulate economic
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 62
In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor, emphasized the intrusion of federal criminal law into an
area of traditional state control.° A vital component of federalism,
Justice Kennedy stated, is accountability; citizens must have some
means of knowing which of the two governments, state or federal, to
hold accountable for the failure to perform a certain function."
" See id. at 559.
55 See id.
56 See Lopez, 519 U.S. at 559.
57 See Id. at 560.
56 See id. at 559 (citations omitted).
55
 See id. at 561.
55 Id. at 561 ti.3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
61 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
62 See id. at 561.
65 See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" See id. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
July 20001
	
Commerce Clause and Criminal Law 	 921
When the federal government invades an area of traditional state
concern, like the police power, the boundaries between state and fed-
eral spheres blur. 65 In the absence of a truly enumerated and well-
defined commerce power, and in the face of the political convenience
in ignoring the limits of federal laW-making authority, Justice Kennedy
argued that the Court could not abstain altogether from the federal-
ism debate. 66 Moreover, he warned, broad assertions of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction prevent the states from acting as "laboratories for ex-
perimentation" in devising new approaches to deterring critne. 67
Justice Souter warned in his Lopez dissent that the Court's distinc-
tion between economic and non-economic activity represented a re-
turn to "the old pitfalls" of the arbitrary distinctions between "direct
and "indirect" effects on counnerce.69 In a separate dissent, Justice
Breyer added that he believed that Congress might rationally con-
clude that guns in classrooms did indeed substantially affect com-
merce.69 Guns interfere with the ability of teachers to educate stn-
, dents, significantly reducing the quality of education." Students
represent the future workforce of America, and their diminished
learning results in decreased productivity for industry.” Thus, Justice
Breyer argued, Congress might rationally conclude that guns in
American classrooms have - a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce." To demonstrate the rational nature of such a conclusion, Jus-
tice Breyer appended a lengthy compilation of sources."
In the wake of Lopez, lower courts have been reticent to circum-
scribe Congress's authority to enact criminal law under the Com-
merce Clause." FOr example, lower courts have rejected Lopez chal-
lenges to Hobbs Act prosecutions for robbery in almost every
instance, relying either upon the express jurisdictional element con
'15 See id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6G See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 See id. at 606,608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69 See id. at 618-21,625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 See id. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 620-21 (Breyer, J., (lissenting).
72 Id. at 625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
73 See id. at 631-644 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74 See, e.g., Funk, supra note 4, at 14 (as of the slimmer of 1098, of the 400 Lopez chal-
lenges 10 federal statutes made, only three had been upheld).
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tamed in the Act," or upon Congressional intent to regulate criminal
activity which has a substantial effect on commerce. 76
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND HISTORY: COLONIAL, STATE AND
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Juxtaposed against this expansive view of the Commerce Clause is
the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has
traveled an admittedly "unsteady path." 77 The Tenth Amendment re-
serves all power not granted to the federal government to the "States
respectively, or to the people."78
 The Court has in the past found ex-
ternal constraints on Congress's Commerce Clause authority through
reference to the Tenth Amendment and traditional powers reserved
to the states." A review of the Court's recent Tenth Amendment ju-
risprudence, as well as the historical roots of both state and federal
criminal law, is helpful in defining the roles of each. 8°
A. The Tenth Amendment as an External Limit on Congress's Commerce
Clause Authority
In National League of Cities v. Usery, in 1976, the Supreme Court
attempted to define the external limit that the Tenth Amendment
imposes upon federal Commerce Clause authority. 81 In that case, 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")—originally
enacted by Congress under the Commerce Clause almost thirty years
earlier—had extended the minimum wage and maximum hours pro-
visions of that Act to almost all city and state employees. 82 Cities and
states protested, arguing that although Congress possesses broad
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amend-
75 See, e.g., United States v. Fairish, 122 F.3d 146, 148-49 (2c1 Cir. 1997); United States
v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d
1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3(1 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Michael McGrail, Note.
The Hobbs Act After Lopez, 41 B.C. L. RE•. 940 (2000) (reviewing appellate court holdings in
Hobbs Act prosecutions and suggesting alternate method of analysis).
7° See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (101h Cir. 1995); see also McGrail, supra note 75, at 949.
77
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
7° U.S. CoNs .r. amend. X.
79 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
80 See infra notes 81-184 and accompanying text.
81 See 426 U.S. at 845-46.
82 See id. at 836.
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anent protection of state sovereignty acts as an external limit to that
power." A majority of the Court agreed, observing that "[dills Court
has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress
to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise ple-
nary powers ... to regulate commerce. "84 The Court noted that de-
spite language in a leading Commerce Clause case that dismissed the
Tenth Amendment as a mere "truism," the Tenth Amendment de-
clares that Congress may not exercise its power in a manner which
impairs the states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system." The Court added that although Congress may oth-
erwise possess the legislative authority to do so, it may not invade cer-
tain attributes fundamental to the sovereignty of state governments
and essential to their functioning. 86
One attribute of state sovereignty, the Court continued, is the
power to determine the wages and hours of those employed to carry
out government functions, such as police and fire protection. 87 In ad-
dition to cost increases imposed upon states, the Court expressed
concern that FLSA would also interfere with state employment policy
decisions, such as hiring people with little training or students on
their summer breaks." The Court noted that this "interfere[nce] with
traditional aspects of state - sovereignty" became even more glaring
when FLSA's overtime provisions were considered, forcing the states
to increase hiring or wages regardless of the states' own employment
policy decisions." The Court concluded that by regulating the "States
Qua States,"" FLSA unconstitutionally eroded the ability of the states
to continue a separate and independent existence. 91
Five years later, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, the Court developed a three part test based upon the
holding of National League of Cities.92 In that case, an association of
coal producers challenged federal regulations governing mining prac-
tices in part because the regulations invaded traditional state author-
88 See id. at 841.
Bi
 See id. at 842.
88 See id. (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (citing United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
88 See New York v. United States, 426 U.S. at. 845-46 (citation omitted).
87 See id. at 845.
88 See id. at 846-48.
See id. at 849-50.
" Id. at 847.
See New York v. United States, 426 U.S. at 855.
" 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).
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ity to regulate land us. 98 The Court stated that a successful Tenth
Amendment challenge' must show (1) that the challenged statute
regulates the "States as States," (2) the federal regulation addresses
matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty, and (3) .
state compliance with the regulation would directly impair their abil-
ity to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmen-
tal functions.94 The Court held that because the federal mining regu-
lations governed only private individuals, rather than states, the Tenth
Amendment challenge failed.95
In EEOC v. Wyoming, in 1983, the Supreme Court further refined
its analysis of the external constraints the Tenth Amendment imposed
upon the Commerce Clause.96 In that case, a game warden forced to
retire by the Wyoming Game and Fish Department fought his invol-
untary retirement, seeking enforcement of Congress's 1974 amend-
ment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") that
extended the provisions of that law to state employees. 97 Although the
Court acknowledged the management of state parks as a traditional
state function, it nevertheless upheld the application of the ADEA to
protect the game warden as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. 98 The Court reasoned that the degree of federal in-
trusion in that instance was not sufficient to use to an impermissible
interference with state sovereignty, and that there was no showing of
the potential impact on the ability of a state to structure its opera-
tions." Even if the federal intrusion had been of a greater degree, the
Court noted that the federal interest in protecting older workers,
when weighed against state sovereignty, might still justify state submis-
sion to federal regulation.m
National League of Cities and its progeny survived for less than ten
years." In 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority;
the Supreme Court reconsidered the 1974 amendments to FLSA. 192 In
93 See id. at 284-85.
94 Sea id. at 287-88.
95 See id. at 293. The Court also observed that under the Commerce Clause, Congress
could have displaced state regulation of surface coal mining altogether. "We fail to see why
In regulation) should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to
allow the States a regulatory role." Id. at 290.
96 Sec 460 U.S. 226,239 (1983).
97 See id. at 233.
98 See id. at 239.
" See id.
See id. at 237 (citation omitted); see also id. at 243 n.17.
101
 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
102 See id. at 530.
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that case, a federal district court had concluded that owning and op-
erating a municipal mass-transit system was a traditional governmental
function, thus placing the transit authority's employees beyond the
reach of 1974 amendments to FLSA. 105 Observing that the "traditional
governmental . funCtion" test had proven not only unworkable, but
also inconsistent with established principles of federalism, the Court
overruled National League of Cities. 3 C4
The Court noted that, since its decision in National League of Cit-
ies, it had made little headway in defining the scope of the state gov-
ernmental functions to he protected. 1°5 The Court added that, once
the "traditional governmental function" test was rejected, no alterna-
tive test appeared workable. 106 The Court refused to look at the his-
torical authority of states in particular areas, because such a standard
would not allow courts to accommodate state expansion into non-
traditional areas such as education.'" The Court. also rejected any
non-historical standard, such as "uniquely" governmental functions,
finding that such standards would be as unmanageable as the stan-
dard in National League of Cities."8
The Court concluded that judicial determinations of state im-
munity from federal regulation were inconsistent with the constitu-
tional dlesign.l® The principal protections afforded states were politi-
cal, and lay in the structure of the federal government itself. 11° As
proof of the effectiveness of these structural safeguards, the Court
pointed to the success states had enjoyed in recent years in drawing
funding from the federal government, with federal grants increasing
from $7 billion to $96 billion between 1958 and 1983. 111 Acknowledg-
ing that structural changes had occurred since the drafting of the
Constitution—particularly the direct election of senators through the
Seventeenth .Amenchnent—the Court explained that "we are con-
vinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme
imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is
one of process rather than one of result. "112
1 " See id.
1 °1 See id. at 531.
105 See id. at 539.
1 °° See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543.
107 See id. at 543-44.
1 °5 See id. at 545.
109 See id. at 546-47.
110 See id. at 552 (citations omitted).
111 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552, 55221.12 (citations omitted).
112 See id. at 554.
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In dissent, Justice Rehnquist summed up the fundamental dis-
agreement between members of the Court about the nature of feder-
alism and the Tenth Amendment: "I do not think it incumbent on
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle
that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a ma-
jority of this Court." Justice O'Connor echoed his view: "I share Jus-
tice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again assume its
constitutional responsibility."114
In New York v. United States, in 1992, the federalist wing of the Su-
preme Court moved toward assuming that "constitutional responsibil-
ity," addressing the proper division of authority between the federal
and state governments. 115 In that case, the Court considered whether
Congress possessed the authority to enact certain provisions of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which, among other meas-
ures, forced states to take title to radioactive waste if they failed to
provide for the disposal of that waste. 116
 Upholding the other provi-
sions of the Act, the Court struck down the take-title provision as un-
constitutional in light of the Tenth Amendment and state sover-
eignty.'"
According to the Court, the division between federal and state
authority is sharply defined by Article I of the Constitution and the
Tenth Amendment: "If a power is delegated to Congress in the Con-
stitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation
of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress."" 8
 Thus, the Tenth
Amendment directs the Court to determine whether an incident of
state sovereignty is protected by a limit on Article I power." 9
Despite reference to the Tenth Amendment, the Court distin-
guished this case from Garcia and other Tenth Amendment cases. 12°
Unlike Garcia, which considered the authority of Congress to subject
states to generally applicable laws, New York v. United States concerned
the circumstances under which Congress could use a state to imple-
113 See id. at 580 (Rehnquist; J., dissenting).
" 4 See id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113 See 505 U.S. at 149.
116 See id. at 150-54.
117 See d. at 157,187-88.
118 See id. at 156.
"9 See id. at 157.
1" See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160-61.
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ment federal regulations. 121 Looking to the history of the Constitu-
tional Convention, the Court noted that an early draft of the New jer-
sey Plan suggested that state officials ought to execute federal laws
and policies. 122 Ultimately, however, the Convention chose a national
government that derived its power from the people, and governed
them directly, as we11. 123 Under this constitutional design, the federal
government may not compel the states to regulate their people in a
certain manner. 124
The Court noted that Congress may still induce states to regulate
in a certain manner, either through economic rewards under the
spending power, or by regulating directly under an Article I power so
as to pre-empt state authority in that area. 125 Either of these methods
preserves the accountability of both federal and state governments to
their electorate. 126 For example, state officials can accept or reject
federal funding, according to the desires of the people in that state.' 27
Likewise, federal officials can be elected or rejected on the basis of
the national policies they endorse. 128 Accountability is diminished,
however, when the federal government "commandeers" state officials
and coerces them into enforcing federal policies. 129 State officials may
thus be forced to bear the consequences of an unpopular federal
regulatory program, while federal officials remain insulated from the
angry electorate within the states.'" The Court added that even if a
state "consents" to subject itself to a federal plan, the plan is still
void."S 1 Congress cannot expand its constitutional authority at the ex-
pense of others. 132
B. Criminal Law Enforcement as an Attribute of State Sovereignty: Historical
Roots of State and Federal Police Power
Assuming that a majority of today's Court might be amenable to a
Tenth Amendment argument that the state police powers in the area
121
 See id.
122 See id. at 164.
123 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 165.
124 See id. at 166,
125 See id. at 167.
126 See id. at. 168:
127 See id.
148 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168.
129 See id. at 169.
130
 See id.
131 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182.
132 See id.
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of criminal law are a "traditional" component of sovereignty, it is help-
ful to consider the origin of both state and federal criminal law. 133
Some excellent records of early criminal prosecutions have been
compiled, particularly in Massachusetts and Virginia, two of the most
influential original colonies. 134
 A study of these records demonstrates
what the Founders may have understood to lie within the proper pur-
view of the states.'"
Colonial criminal law derived from a mix of provincial statutes
and common law, influenced by the physical and social environment
of the New World as well as the ideological views of the colonists)" In
a 1767 charge to a grand jury, for example, Chief Justice Hutchinson
of the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judicature observed that "B]n
this Country we have always been happy in a good Set of Laws. The
principal Crown-Law of this Province is grounded on our provincial
Laws; where these fail, the Common Law of England is the Rule. "137
Similarly, the Virginia General Court heard trials on statutory and
common law felonies such as arson, burglary, robbery, counterfeiting,
murder, rape and treason. 138 Though there were other crimes that fell
within the jurisdiction of the Virginia General Court, little evidence
exists that they were ever enforced. 139
Colonists particularly feared arson because of the destruction fire
could wreak to homes and people. 14° In 1730, the Virginia Assembly
passed into law a bill providing that any person convicted of mali-
ciously, unlawfully, and willingly engaging in arson would be found a
felon without benefit of clergy. 141 Destruction of property—whatever
' 33 Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 259-60; cf: id.
at 156-57; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134 See generallyJOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN TIIE
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1 761
AND 1772 (Josiah Quincy, Jr. ed., 1865); HUGH 1 RANKIN, TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1965).
135 See infra notes 136-184 and accompanying text.
ISO See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22-23
(1993).
137
 See QUINCY, supra note 134, at 235.
138 See RANKIN, supra note 134, at 126-226.
135
 See id. at 126.
14° See id,
141 See id. at 126-27. "Benefit of clergy" originated in feudal England as a privilege ex-
tended to clergy accused of committing a felony. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 440 (1999). Over time, the privilege was extended to anyone
who could read Psalm 51:1—known as the "neck verse" because it kept one's neck out of
the noose. See id. By 1705, even the reading was abolished, and benefit of clergy had be-
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the means—weighed heavily in the minds of the colonists. In Massa-
chusetts, Chief Justice Hutchinson, whose home was destroyed by a
mob protesting the imposition of the Stamp Act in 1765, appeared in
court the morning after the riot—wearing clothes borrowed from
friends—to warn the colonists that "this is not the Way to proceed—
the Laws of our Country are open to punish those who have of-
fended. "142
Thefts of all types plagued the colonists in both Massachusetts
and Virginia, particularly in the 1760s, around the time England be-
gan sending larger numbers of convicts to the New World."5 Chief
Justice Hutchinson admonished a Massachusetts grand jury in 1766
that It] here has been of late, a great Number of Thefts and Robber-
ies committed in the Day-time in many of the neighbouring Towns,"
and urged the grand jury to be alert for similar crimes in Boston. 144
The Virginia laws against theft and the severity of their punishment—
which ranged from as little as a few lashes to conviction and punish-
ment as a felon—reflected a similar interest in protecting citizens in
their property.145
The presence of multiple currencies in colonial Virginia made
enforcing laws against counterfeiting difficult. 146 As a formal matter,
counterfeiting was a crime against the King, and those found guilty of
this high treason were to be sentenced to a horrible death. 147 Though
at least one colonist was tried, convicted and executed for this crime,
the colonists did not share the traditional English taste for gore, and
dispensed with the formalities in preference of a simple hanging. 148
Massachusetts had a similar prohibition against counterfeiting the
come a one-time opportunity to escape the death penalty for those who had been con-
victed of a felony and sentenced to death. See id.
142 See QuiNcv, supra note 139, at 172-73.
147 See RANKIN, supra note 134, at 158.
144 See Qunicv , supra note 134, at 223.
115 See RANKIN, SUM note 134, at 159,161.
146 See id. at 177-78.
147 See id. at 177. In 1736. the punishment for high treason was described:
The Offender shall be drawn upon a Hurdle, backward, with his Head down-
ward, from the Prison to the Gallows, and there 1)111101, then cut down alive,
his Privy Members cut off', and his Entrails cut out, his Body quartered, and
his Head and Quarters hang'd up: All his Lands, Goods and Chattels, are for-
feited, and his Blood corrupted. But in Counterfeiting &c. of Current Coin,
there is no Corruption of Blood—
Id. at 177-78 n.76 (citation omitted).
Ha See id. at 187.
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King's coin, although the provincial law made it a lesser crime than
treason against the King. 149
Both the Massachusetts and Virginia courts heard trials for mur-
der and rape.' 5° Chief Justice Hutchinson instructed one grand jury:
"Homicide . . . is another Offence which you are to take Notice of,
and this ... may be done, either by shooting, striking, poisoning, or
any other Way, however secret, by which the Life of a Man is de-
stroyed."151
 With little exception, the punishment for these crimes was
death. 152
As the colonists began to speak rebellious words more openly in
the late 1760s, the colonial courts struggled to keep a lid on open re-
bellion—largely through stern warnings about the consequences of
treason. 153 Treason encompassed any rebellion, sedition or speaking
against the King or government. 154
 Chief Justice Hutchinson warned
those critics of the colonial government and the Crown published in
local newspapers that he would "not pronounce those Authors guilty
of High Treason; but I will venture to say, they come as near it as pos-
sible, and not come within it." 159 Even after the Revolution, the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention—perhaps concerned for the
integrity of their newly formed state governments—refused to cede all
authority to prosecute treason to the federal government. 156
After the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, the new
state governments continued to make and enforce criminal laws.'"
149 See QUINCY, supra note 134, at 221.
150 See id. at 176 (recounting a 1765 charge to the Grand Jury in which Chief Justice
Hutchinson instructed "You are to inspect all Felonies ... All Offences that more immedi-
ately respect the Morals of the People you are to enquire of such as.... Profaneness,
Lewdness, and those Crimes which a chaste Ear cannot hear the Recital of"); id. at 221
(murder); RANKIN, supra note 134, at 220 (rape); id. at 204 (murder).
See QUINCY, supra note 134, at 222.
152 See RANKIN, supra note 134, at 204,219.
155 See QUINCY, supra note 134, at 245-46,260.
154 See RANKIN, Stipra note 134, at 223.
155 QUINCY, supra note 134, at 263.
156 See Adam 14. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal
CriminalJu•sdiction, 45 EMORY . L.J. 1,43-44 (1996).
157 The unremarkable nature of this statement, and the continuity of criminal law en-
forcement in the transition from colonial to state government, is demonstrated by a Mas-
sachusetts law entitled An ACT providing for the Payment of Costs in criminal Prosecu-
tions, and for preventing unnecessary Costs therein" enacted in 1791. .See ASAHEI. STEARNS
& LEMUEL SHAW, THE GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION TO FEBRUARY, 1822, at 403 (Theron Metcalf ed., 1823). That Act found
colonial statutory provisions for the payment of costs in criminal prosecutions in-
sufficient—though still valid—and established a new program to pay for criminal law en-
forcement. See id. at 403-06.
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Indeed, there was an unbroken passage of power and legitimacy from
colonial to state governments; for example, despite the colonial origin
of law reports compiled by Josiah Quincy, Jr. in the Superior Court of
Judicature for Massachusetts Bay between 1761 and 1772, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court routinely cited to those reports long
after achieving independence, and continued to cite Quincy's Reports
as late as 1959. 158
Although the states have enjoyed a pre-eminent position in
defining criminal law and punishment since the original thirteen
colonies were chartered some 350 years ago, the Constitution created
some police power in the federal government at its inception. 159 Fed-
eral criminal law issues received only modest consideration during the
Constitutional Convention, however. 1" Debate on the substantive is-
sues of criminal law revolved almost exclusively around four main top-
ics: (1) piracy, (2) crimes against the law of nations, (3) treason and
(4) counterfeiting. 161 While there was broad agreement that these is-
sues required national governmental action and thus deserved men-
tion in the Constitution, there was also great reluctance to cede
criminal law enforcement powers to the new federal government or to
have prosecutions for those crimes tried in federal court. 162
There was little opposition to the general principle that piracy
was an appropriate subject for the new federal government. 165 The
Convention thus agreed, after some discussion, to delegate the
authority to define and punish piracy and felonies on the high seas
exclusively to Congress. 164 Moreover, pursuant to Congress's power to
make laws regarding the coining of money, the Convention agreed
that Congress should also have the power to punish counterfeiting. 165
To some extent, this power was necessary because the Constitution
rejected the common law conception of treason—of which counter-
feiting was a part—in favor of a more restrictive definition. 166
158 See Daniel R. Cognilleite, First Flower—the Earliest American Law Reports and the Ex-
tramylinaly Josiah Qui my ( 1 744-1 775), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV, 1, 10 (109G) (citations omit-
ted).
159 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 46.
160 See id. at 25.
161 See id. at 25-26.
162 See id. at 28.
163 See id. at 33.
1€4 see
 Kurland, supra note 156, at 38.
165 See id. at 39-40.
166 See id. at 41.
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In fact, considerable debate surrounded provisions for prosecu-
tion of treason during the Constitutional Convention, largely because
some representatives insisted that the states should retain the power
to define and prosecute treason independent of the federal power to
do so. 167 In spite of concerns expressed by Madison that the separate
powers of the state and federal governments to prosecute treason
would result in multiple prosecutions, the notion that a sovereign in-
herently possesses the power to punish treason as a form of self-
protection proved too enduring to be overcome at the Convention. 168
The states and federal government thus shared the power to prose-
cute treason."
Bribery appears in the Constitution in the context of impeach-
ment, from which some infer a power in Congress to enact federal
criminal legislation. 170
 Because the common law conception limited
bribery prosecutions to public officials, the Convention felt no need
to define the term further, and Congress did not hesitate to make
statutory provisions defining bribery and prescribing the punishment
for a number of public officials guilty of misconduct. 171
Thus, piracy, counterfeiting, treason, and perhaps bribery of
public officials were within the legitimate domain of the federal
criminal law ordained in the Constitution. 172 Congress extended its
reach somewhat more, however, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause in conjunction with its enumerated powers almost as soon as it
met in 1789. 173
 In 1792, Congress used the Postal Clause to criminal-
ize various postal crimes, such as robbing and stealing mail. 174 This
early instance of concurrent jurisdiction has been taken as evidence
that the spheres of state and federal sovereignty blurred and over-
lapped even at the outset of the Republic. 173
In Cohens v. Virginia, in 1821, the Supreme Court described the
relationship between the federal and state governments in the do-
main of criminal law. 176
 In that case, a man convicted in a Virginia
state court for selling lottery tickets in violation of a Virginia statute
167 See id. at 42-44.
166 See id. at 43-44.
169 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 43-44.
17° See id. at 48.
171 See id. at 48, 53.
172 See id. at 46.
175 See id. at 58.
174 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 58.
175
 See id. at 62.
176 See 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) '264 (1821).
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argued that his conviction could not stand because Congress had
authorized the government of the District of Columbia to sell those
lottery tickets.'" He argued that the Congressional act invalidated any
Virginia criminal provisions against lottery ticket sales.'" The Court
observed that Congress possesses the authority to punish murder in a
federal facility—and even the concealment of that crime outside the
facility—"but no general right to punish murder committed within
any of the States."179 Moreover, the Court stated that "[i]t is dear, that
Congress cannot punish felonies generafiy." 180
The Court added, however, that the Constitution delegated to
the Congress enumerated powers, and with that all of the authority
necessary to carry out those enumerated powers.' 9' Thus Congress
could pass legislation to punish certain felonies ; where those felonies
threatened an enumerated ,power.182 Nevertheless, the Court coun-
seled against presuming that CotigreSs would lightly invade state pre-
rogatives with respect to the criminal law. 185 Holding that Congress
had expressed no clear intent to allow the sale of lottery tickets past
the borders of the District of Columbia, the Court upheld the comic-
tion as a valid exercise of Virginia criminal law. 184
III. THE FORGOTTEN ROLE OF THE SENATE: VOICE OF THE STATES
Although, as Chief Justice Marshall observed in Gibbons, the ques-
tion of the reach of congressional commerce power is primarily po-
litica1, 195 substantial changes have occurred in our national govern-
ment in the past 100 years that undermine the protection afforded
state sovereignty. 186 The shift from a Senate elected by state legisla-
tures to one elected directly by the people—a change effected by the
ratification in 1913 of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion—was apparently directed at the undesirable control of state legis-
177 See id. at 375.
178 See id. at 375, 37G.
179 Id. at 426.
180 Id. at 428.
181 See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 429 ("Congress is not a local legislature. ... The American
people thought it a necessary power. ... Being so conferred, it carries with it all those
incidental powers which arc necessary to its complete and effectual execution.").
182 See id. at 426.
193 See id. at 443.
194 See id. at 448.
185 See Gibbons v. (Wen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
185 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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latures by party bosses, and did not contemplate the radical impact
this change would have upon federalism. 187
The Founders originally provided in the Constitution that the
Senate was to be elected by the state legislatures. 188 As Madison ex-
plained in The Federalist:
the appointment of senators by the state legislatures. . is
recommended by the double advantage of favouring a select
appointment, and of giving to the state governments such an
agency in the formation of the federal government, as must
secure the authority of the former; and may form a conven-
ient link between the two systems. 189
Madison noted that the equal vote for each state in the Senate recog-
nized the equal share each state had in preserving their residual sov-
ereignty "to guard by every possible expedient against an improper
consolidation of the states into one simple republic." 190 Thus, for the
first 120 years of the Republic, senators represented their state gov-
ernments, not the people in their states. 191
When Progressive senators proposed an amendment to the Con-
stitution providing for the direct election of senators in May 1908,
they cited the support of twenty-seven state legislatures, and urged
senators from those states to aid in passing the amendment. 192 The
resolution died in committee after being referred to the Committee
on Privileges and Elections. 193 Undeterred, Progressive senators again
introduced a resolution calling for the direct election of senators with
the next Congress. 194 Oil May 31, 1910, they came to the floor of the
Senate armed with the resolutions and laws of thirty-seven states—
"over three-fourths of the States of the Union." 195 Progressives recited
a litany of progressive reforms that had been defeated in the Senate,
and attributed those defeats to the corruption of the party machin-
ery. 196 Supporters of the amendment believed that direct election
187 See C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY 17-19 (1995).
188 See U.S. CoNsT. an  I, § 3.
189 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 313 (James Madison) (Carry Wills ed., 1982).
19° See id, at 314.
191 Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, with U.S. CoNs•r. amend. XVII.
992 See 60 CONG. REC. 6803-04 (1908).
193 See 60 CONG. REC. 6809 (1908); 61 CONG. REC. 7112 (1910).
194 See61 CONG. REC. 7112 (1910).
198 61 CoNG. REC. 7113 (1910).
PG See 61 CONG. REC. 7122-24 (1910). According to one senator:
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would serve as a panacea for all of the ills induced by "the ma-
chine."197
Although that resolution also failed to muster the necessary two-
thirds support in the last week of the 61st Congress, proponents of the
resolution knew that they would have an adequate number of votes tO
pass the resolution in the next Congress. 198 That is precisely what
happened; exhausted and overwhelmed, opponents to the measure
relented after a desultory debate in the Senate.' 99 The measure was
reported out of a joint House-Senate committee as the Seventeenth
Amendment on May 13, 1912, and submitted to the state legislatures
for ratification.m The state legislatures ratified the amendment in less
than a year with remarkably little debate, despite profound constitu-
tional consequences to state representation in the federal govern-
ment.291
IV. COOPERATIVE AND ADVERSARIAL MODELS OF CONCURRENT STATE-
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Although it is difficult to establish a causal link, it can definitively
be said that federal criminal law has expanded dramatically since the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. 202 According to the
American Bar Association Task Force on Federalization of Criminal
Law ("Task Force"), just 8% of all federal criminal provisions enacted
since the Civil War were adopted prior to 1909, four years before the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. 293 After 1909, federal
criminal statutes steadily increased in frequency. 204 More than 40% of
the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been
It is not true ... that purity in politics is an iridescent dream. It can be made a
reality ... by the overthrow of the imperfect mechanism of party government
which has evolved the bad system of machine-rule government. The remedy
for the evils front which our national, state and municipal governments have
suffered is to restore the rule of the people.
Id. at 7123.
1 °1 See id. at 7123 ("The people have no sinister purposes. The people will not sell
out."); see also 61 CONG. REC. 2494-95 (1911); id. at 2251,2257-58.
Is° See HOEBEKE, supra note 187, at 182.
1" See id. at. 182-83.
2" See id. at 189.
NI See id. at 189-90.
2°2 See James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. TASK FORCE
ON FEDERALIZATION OF GRIM. L. Cm,. JusT. SEC. 9 chart 2.
2°3 See id.
7°4 See id.
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enacted since 1970,205 many of these touching on traditional state po-
lice power areas such as arson, murder, rape and theft. 206 Congress
continues to expand the reach of federal criminal law, an expansion
which the Task Force recently warned could undermine the historical .
decentralization of the criminal law which has served our nation so
wel1.207
 The Task Force has identified almost 10,000 criminal and pu-
nitive civil sanctions which are spread throughout the United States
Code. 208 These criminal and punitive civil sanctions are so pervasive,
however, that no comprehensive list of every federal criminal sanction
is possible to compile. 2°°
Although they operate independently, state and federal law en-
forcement officials differ more in the manner in which they are se-
lected than in the crime control issues they face.") The President of
the United States appoints a United State Attorney to each judicial
district with the advice and consent of the Senate; subject to removal
by the President, U.S. Attorneys serve a term of four years. 211 Depend-
ing upon the size of a state, there can be from one to four U.S. Attor-
neys appointed. 212
 By contrast, forty-one state attorneys general are
directly elected by the people within that state.213 The remaining at-
205 See id. at 7.
206 See id. at app. C.
2° 7 See Strazzella, supra note 202, at 43.
208 See id. at 10; see also id. at 10 11.11 (observing that although a number of "approxi-
mately 3000 federal crimes" is frequently cited, that number is already 16 years old).
209 See id. at 10.
210 See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (providing that U.S. Attorney shall prosecute all offenses
against United States); see also Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: flow Federal Prosecutom
Can Reduce Violent C n ime, 26 FORDHANI URIL U. 573, 581 (1999) (stating that federal
prosecutors have "begun systematically to stake out territory traditionally dominated by
district attorneys.").
211
 See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (a)—(c) (1994).
212 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (designating Massachusetts as one judicial district);
28 U.S.C. § 84 (1994) (dividing California into four judicial districts).
213
 Compare 28 U.S.C. §541(a)—(c) (1994), oath ALA. CONST. art. V, § 114; Amz. CoNsr.
art. V, §1; ARK. CONS'''. art. VI, §§ 1, 3; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11; Cow. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1,
3; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-124 (West 1988); DEL. CONST. art. III, § 21; FLA. CONST. art.
IV, §§ 4, 5; GA. CONST. Mt V § 3, 1 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 2;
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-1-2 (Michie 1096); IOWA CONST. art. V, § 12; KAN CONST. art. I, § 1;
Ky. CONST. § 91; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MD. CONST. art. V, § I; MASS. CONST. amend.
XVII; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 1.V(21 ); MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 173;
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 17; Motrr. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § I; NEV. CONST.
art. 5, § 19 N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 7; N.D.
CONST. art. V, § 2; Oino CoNsT. art. III, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4; OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 180.010,020 (1989); R.I. CONST. art. IV, § I; S.C. CONST, art. VI, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. IV,
§ 7; TEX. CONST. art. 4, § I, 2; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 151
(1995); VA. CONST. art. V, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. VI, §1 .
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torneys general are appointed by the governor or some other elected
state official or officials. 04
Cooperative crime-fighting efforts between these local and fed-
eral officials can result in significant reductions in local crime. 215 Fed-
eral prosecutors, armed with the resources of the federal government
and the stiff penalties under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, can have
a tremendous impact on local crime. 216 For example, in February
1997, President Clinton lauded federal, state and local officials in Bos-
ton for their coordinated effort in combating juvenile crime, particu-
larly gang violence. 217 Known as the "Boston Plan," the joint effort
emphasizes intervention, prevention and enforcement. 21 s The inter-
vention and prevention elements utilize a variety of community-based
programs, funded by both the state and federal governments, to pro-
vide young people with alternative after-school and summer activities,
encouraging them to pursue professional careers rather than crime as
a vocation.219
The threat of federal prosecution is particularly potent in the
area of enforcement. 220 After the Youth Violence Strike Force
(WSF)—a division of the Boston Police Department—identifies juve-
nile violence hot spots within the city, it sends representatives to meet
With both community members and gang members to warn that these
neighborhoods will receive intensive police attention unless the vio-
lence stops. 221 Together with the Suffolk County District Attorney and
U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, city officials target the
most dangerous offenders for federal prosecution, in order to take
214 Six of the remaining attorneys general are appointed by the governor, often with
some form of advice and consent from the state legislature. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.010-
020; FlAw. REV. STAT. Aim § 28-1 to 7 (Michie 1999); N.H. CONST. art. 46; Nj. CONST. art.
5, § 4, Y 3; PA. CONST. art. 4, § 8; Mo. STAT. ANN, § 9-1-601 (Michie 1999). One attorney
general is elected by state senators and representatives. See Me. CONST. art. 9, § 11. The
Tennessee Supreme Court appoints that state's attorney general, see TENN. CONST. art. VI,
§ 5, but. the judges of that court are elected, see id. at art. VI, § 3.
215 See, e.g., Brian Privor, Dusk	 Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness of juvenile
Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. l,. Roc 415, 475 (1999).
216 See Glazer, supra note 210, at. 574.
2 ' 7 See Ann Scales, Clinton Offers Crime Plan, Cites Boston Effort in Push for $500M in Youth
Programs, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1997, at Al.
218 See Privor, supra note 215, al 476.
219 See id. at 478-81. A complete review of the prey Mon and intervention programs
are beyond the scope of this Note; nevertheless, their importance to the success of the
Boston Plan cannot and should not be underestimated.
22° See id. at 477.
221 See id. at 476-77.
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advantage of greater federal resources and the stiffer penalties meted
out under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 222
These measures have significantly reduced youth violence in Bos-
ton.223 From the plan's initiation in 1995 to 1997, homicides commit-
ted in Boston by people under twenty-four years oId dropped from
forty to fifteen. 224
 Between 1995 and 1998, only four firearms homi-
cides of youths under the age of sixteen occurred in the city, with one
eighteen month period from July 1995 through the end of 1996 dur-
ing which no juveniles were killed by gunfire. 225
 When Brooklyn
officials confronted an increase in youth violence in 1999, they turned
to the Boston Plan as their mode1. 226 A key component of that plan,
worked out by federal and local law-enforcement officials, included
federal criminal prosecutions of the worst offenders. 227
On the other hand, the failure of federal and local law-
enforcement officials to coordinate their efforts can result in
significant waste of scarce resources, and awaken state-federal jealous-
ies and animosities. 228 For example, in United States v. Miles, two men
who committed a string of armed robberies of McDonald's restau-
rants, a Taco Bueno restaurant and a Caller's Barbecue and Grill in
and around Gainesville, Texas were convicted of, among other
charges, four counts of interference with interstate commerce by rob-
bery under the Hobbs Act. 229 One month after the last of these rob-
beries, a Cooke County grand jury indicted the two for aggravated
robbery in connection with the robbery of one of the McDonald's
222 See id. at 477; see also Glazer, supra note 210, at 574-75.
223 See Privor, supra note 215, at 475; Fred Kaplan, Brooklyn Adopts Boston Plan' on Slay-
ings, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1999, at A14.
224 See Kaplan, supra note 223, at A14.
223 See Privor, supra note 215, at 475; see also Kaplan, supra note 223, at A14.
22'6 See Kaplan, supra note 223, at A14.
227 See id. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes said:
We'll tell [gang members' they're going to knock oti violence in the neigh-
borhood. The options are: If you help us, we'll help you had employment. If
you don't help its, we'll target every one of you ... Candi there will be no plea
bargaining. We'll ask for jail, the highest sentence, the highest bail, and the
U.S. Attorney will take over cases where federal punishment would be more
severe.
Id.
223 f, e.g., United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J.,
specially concurring).
223 See id at 236.
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restaurants. 230 Nevertheless, three months later the U.S. Attorney for
the Northern District of Texas filed an eleven count indictment,
which included the McDonald's robbery and several others. 231
While the Fifth Circuit upheld the Hobbs Act convictions in Miles
with a per curiam decision, one judge noted in a special concurrence
that "Whe prosecution of local crimes is generally considered to be a
state function. "232 The judge noted that no federal law enforcement
agency had been involved in the initial investigation into these rob-
beries, or the identification or apprehension of the suspects. 233 Detec-
tives from the local police department had done all of the legwork in
the case, including gathering victim statements, taking fingerprints at
the crime scenes and interviewing the suspects. 234 "All indications
pointed toward a speedy and successful prosecution ... under Texas
law, and Texas statutes provide for the enhancement of sentences for
repeat offenders and career criminals": 235 The judge observed that he
was bound by Fifth Circuit precedent to uphold the conviction, but
added that he believed that the federal prosecution of a local crime—
particularly in light of the degree of state police work involved in pre-
paring the prosecution—was an unconstitutional usurpation of state
police powers. 236
V. RESTORING THE BALANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO
FEDERALISM
The special concurrence in Miles points to the true problem with
federal criminal law today. 237 The Supreme Court's deferential Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence has allowed Congress to expand a lim-
ited, enumerated power to something more akin to a general police
power.238 The "economic/non-economic" distinction in Morrison and
Lopez attempts to address this issue, yet it represents another attempt
to find an internal limit on the commerce power by describing the
"c' See Texas Briefly: Gainesville: Two Alen Indicted in McDonald's Robbery, Fr. Wolcrit STAR-
TELEGRAm, Jan. 29, 1992, at 15.
211 See Miles, 122 F.3(1 at 237-38.
232 Id. at 250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
255 See id. (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
239 see
 id. (DeMoss4, specially concurring).
255 Id. at 250-51 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
256 See Miles, 122 F.3(1 at 251 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
257 See id. (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
"8 See, e.g., Moulton, supra note 5, at 924; Merritt, supra note 5, at 728-29.
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Commerce Clause itself, 239
 This has proven unsustainable, as past ef-
forts to limit the power of Congress by distinguishing "manufacture"
from "commerce," or "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate
commerce haveproven.no As
 "the switch in time that saved nine"
demonstrates, these are arbitrary definitions that derive their power
from the votes of a majority of the Supreme Court, rather than a
principled approach to federalism. 241 As Justice Breyer copiously
documented in his Lopez dissent, Congress might have rationally con-
cluded that guns affect education, and education affects commerce. 242
It is precisely because of this rational conclusion that internal limits
on the Commerce Clause are inadequate to protect traditional state
sovereignty in crime control. 243
Although he joined the majority opinion in Lopez, Justice Ken-
nedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, observed the difficulty in drawing a
line between economic and non-economic activities. 244 Justice Ken-
nedy expressed concern that the Gun-Free School Zones Act ex-
tended into criminal law, an area rof traditional state control, as evi-Idenced by the fact that possession of a gun on school grounds was
already criminalized by most stat$ 243
 "If Congress attempts that ex-
tension, then at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of na-
tional power seeks to intrude upo
i
n an area of traditional state con-
cern. "246
 That inquiry should be guided by a return to the test of
National League of Cities, which balianced federal intrusion into state
sovereignty against the national interest in federal regulation.247
In Garcia, the dissent signaled that one day the Court would res-
urrect the Tenth Amendment as a bulwark against federal intrusion
into state sovereign ty. 248
 There are three compelling reasons that the
238 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1768 (2000) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 607-08 (1995) (Soure•, J., dissenting).
210
 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768 (Smiler, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607-08
(Sower, J., dissenting).
241 See supra notes 37-49, 68-73 and accompanying text.
212 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-21, 631-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
245 Cf. id., 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Miles, 122 F.3d at 250 (DeMoss, J.,
specially concurring).
241 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (in a sense any conduct in this
interdependent world has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not
yet said the commerce power may reach so far").
215 See id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that over 40 slates already have
criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds).
-	 218 See id. at 580.
247 See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
248 See 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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Court should address federal usurpation of state prerogatives in
criminal law—a bedrock attribute of state sovereignty—through the
Tenth Amendment, 249 First, a return to consideration of the external
limit imposed on Congress's Commerce Clause power by the Tenth
Amendment would bring consistency to the Court's overall Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. 250 Second, despite Garcia's conclusory
dismissal, history can be a guide in determining a state's sovereign
interests, particularly in the area of criminal law. 25 i Third, state prose-
cutors are uniformly more accountable to the people in their states
than their federal counterparts, and thus institutionally are the more
appropriate final decision-making authority in criminal matters. 252
Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the Dormant Commerce Clause has
proven successful in protecting federal authority in the area of inter-
state commerce, while allowing states to regulate intrastate commerce
to the fullest possible extent. 256 In Pike, the Court determined the
outer limits of state power to regulate intrastate commerce by balanc-
ing a state regulation's interference with interstate commerce against
the state interest. 254 This test at once protects Congress's exclusive
authority over interstate commerce, while preserving maximum
flexibility for states in addressing local issues.255 Those same interests
are at work when Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority
over interstate commerce to reach areas of traditional state control,
like criminal law. 256 By imposing the inverse rule of Pike in such
cases—i.e. weighing a federal criminal statute's interference with tra-
ditional state sovereignty against the national interest to be pro-
tected—the Court could bring symmetry to its fractured Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.257 Before being overruled in Garcia, this is pre-
cisely the balancing test the Court employed in cases where it consid-
ered whether the Tenth Amendment presented an external limit to
249 See info notes 25'3-315 and accompanying text.
26° See infra notes 253-259 and accompanying text; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Toward
a Principled Inteipretalion of the Commerce Clause, 22 HAIM l.L. & PUB. POL'r 31, 41, 42
(1998) (citing Pike and suggesting that same presumptions that inform Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence should inform determinatiOn of affirmative scope of Com-
merce Clause).
251 See infra notes 260-273 and accompanying text.
252 See infra notes 274-313 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 21-229 and accompanying text.
254 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
25' See id. at. 143.
256 See Merrill, supra note 250, at 41, 42.
257 Cf. id. at 42.
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Congress's Commerce Clause authority, as in EEOC v. Wymning.258 By
returning to this balancing test, the Court would bring a logical con-
sistency to its Dormant Commerce Clause and Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence, protecting state sovereignty while also preserving maxi-
mum flexibility for Congress to address issues of national
importance . 259
In determining whether a federal criminal statute interferes with
state sovereignty, history can and should be a guide in determining a
state's sovereign interests, particularly in the area of criminal law. 26° In
Garcia, the Court refused to adopt a historical approach to determine
whether a particular state function was an "essential function" of state
government, because such a standard would not allow courts to ac-
commodate state expansion into non-traditional areas such as educa-
tion, 261
 Instead, the Court held that states must rely upon the political
structure embodied in the Constitution for protection from federal
encroachment. 262
 In effect, the Court stated that because it cannot
discover and protect from improper federal intrusion all areas of state
sovereignty through the historical record, it will protect none. 263
While history may not be useful in determining the states' sover-
eign interests in every case, the long tradition of colonial and state
criminal jurisdiction should not be ignored when weighing the state
sovereign interest in criminal law. 264 Early in its own history, the Su-
preme Court indicated that there are limits to Congressional author-
ity to make criminal law. 265
 In Cohens, the Court stated that Congress
could not make a law to punish felonies generally. 266 This would seem
to imply that the early Supreme Court understood the states to be the
primary maker and enforcer of criminal law.267 Historically, the states
258 See 460 U.S. 226, 239, 242 n.17 (1983).
259 Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (balancing state interest protected by state law against
interference with interstate commerce to determine whether statute violates Dormant
Commerce Clause), with EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239, 242 n.17 (balancing federal
interest protected by federal law against interference with slate sovereignty to determine
whether statute violates Tenth Amendment); see also Merrill, supra note 250, at 42.
269 CI New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1992) (referring to the history
of the Constitutional Convention to establish intent of Founders with respect to relation-
ship between states and national government).
261 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-44.
262 See id. at 552 (citations omitted).
263 See id. (citations omitted).
"I See St1PM notes 133-184 and accompanying text.
265 See Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1824).
266 See id.
267 SPe id.
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and their precursor colonial governments have exercised that author-
ity to punish felonies such as arson, murder, rape, and theft, 268 The
states clearly surrendered some traditional authority under the Con-
stitution—as with counterfeiting—but the Tenth Amendment guaran-
tee that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"
seems empty if the only protection of the states' residual authority lies
in the political process. 269
Although the history of federal criminal jurisdiction is helpful in
defining the Founders' and early Congressional understanding of
what the scope of federal criminal law might be, taken alone, it pro-
vides little insight into what powers would have been understood to
remain exclusively within the domain of the states after the
ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 27° Perhaps the
history of federal criminal jurisdiction, taken in conjunction with an
understanding of what colonial and early state governments under-
stood about their authority, best serves to identify core competencies
for federal prosecutors—including matters of piracy, counterfeiting,
treason and bribery. 271 These core competencies are the historical an-
tecedents of the modern federal criminal law, and should have rele-
vance in defining the proper scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. 272
Nevertheless, these core competencies should not be used to com-
pletely obliterate the divide between crimes that are properly within
the jurisdiction of the federal government, and those that are within
the jurisdiction of the states. 278
Congressional intrusion into areas of traditional state concern
might be less objectionable if states retained a voice in federal deci-
2m See supra notes 133-184 and accompimyi ►g text.
269 See supra notes 133-184 and accompanying text. But see Aviam Soifer, Truisms That
Never Will Be True: The 'Ptah Amendment and the Spending POIlla, 57 U. CoLo. L. 12r.v. 793,
810-11,811 n.74 (1986) ("The 'wholly popular' government was free to alter the balance,
if the people so wished, even if at the expense of state sovereignty."). While 1 agree in the
main with Prof. Soifer that the people are free to allocate power between their respective
sovereigns, 1 believe that an allocation that, effectively displaces one of the two sovereigns
should not be undertaken lightly, and is probably best. accomplished by the people
through the amendment process.
279 See supra notes 133-184 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 133-184 and accompanying text; see also Philip B. Heymann & Mark
H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cau-
tions, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY, JaH. 1996, at 115.
272 Cf. Geraldine Szott Moore, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1127,1138 (1997); Heymann & Moore, supra note 271, at 115.
275 See supra notes 133-184 and accompanying text.
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sion-tnaking. 274
 Since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment,
however, states have not had a voice in the Senate—rather, the people
in their states have exercised that role. 275 Admittedly, the state legisla-
tures of all but three states agreed to this radical change in the consti-
tutional structure of the federal government; 276 but given the scant
discussion of federalism and the overwhelming concern with political
machines in the debates leading to the Seventeenth Amendment, it is
an open question whether the states or the people intended such a
result.277 In The Federalist, Madison observed that the indirect election
of senators and their longer, six year term would provide a "cool and
deliberate" body that would serve to slow the legislative process. 278
Arguably, the Seventeenth Amendment eliminated this cool and de-
liberative body, and denied the states any chance of directly partici-
pating in the decisions to dramatically increase the scope of federal
criminal law in the twentieth century. 279
Since 1909, a scant four years before the Seventeenth Amend-
ment was ratified, approximately 92% of all federal criminal statutes
have been enacted—many of those since 1970, and many touching on
traditional state areas such as murder, rape, robbery, burglary and
forgery. 28° Although the dramatic increase in federal criminal provi-
sions in the last ninety years cannot be attributed solely to the loss of a
Senate elected by state legislatures, these criminal provisions
significantly limit the ability of the states to act as laboratories for ex-
perimentation" in devising new methods to deter crime by instituting
a uniform national standard. 281 The states should have some sort of
input into the regulation of criminal conduct, a traditional subject of
the state police power. 282
Given the history of state primacy in the areas of arson, murder,
rape and theft, there should be a rebuttable presumption that federal
prosecution of these crimes infringes on state sovereign ty. 283
 This
should not end the inquiry, however. The most important feature of
both the modern Dormant Commerce Clause cases and the decision
27 ' 1 See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
27° See HOESEKE, supra note 187, at 189.
277 See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
278 THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 320 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
279 See supra notes 185-236 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 202-209 and accompanying text.
281 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
282 Cf.
283 See supra notes 260-273 and accompanying text.
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in National League of Cities is that they struck down state or federal
statutes as applied, rather than facially, thus allowing the continued, if
limited, enforcement of those statutes.2M Although the National
League of Cities test might be criticized because it consistently yielded
decisions favorable to federal power, perhaps that is simply because
federal power is indeed expansive—but not unlimited. 285
A return to the National League of Cities test would give courts the
flexibility to weigh competing values in deciding whether a particular
criminal prosecution violates state sovereignty. 288 This is a far less re-
strictive inquiry than the Lopez test, which categorically strikes clown
federal criminal statutes. 287 In Pike, for example, the Court held that
the Arizona Department of Agriculture could continue to vindicate its
legitimate interests and require in-state cantaloupe growers to ship
their produce in prescribed containers, even if the Department of Ag-
riculture could not reach a border corporation that grew its canta-
loupes in Arizona but shipped them from Southern California. 288 In
Lopez, however, the Court implicitly held that there could be no na-
tional interest in curbing gun possession in public- schools by striking
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act on a facial challenge. 289
In weighing those competing values, federal prosecutors should
be able to overcome the presumption against federal criminal prose-
cutions in areas of traditional state control if the state acquiesces in
the federal prosecution. The benefits of concurrent state and federal
criminal jurisdiction are undeniable. 299 Cooperative law enforcement
strategies have resulted in significant reductions in crime in local ar-
eas. 291 As the Boston Plan demonstrates, federal criminal prosecution
can be a powerful weapon in the hands of state prosecutors when
state and federal officials work together. 292 It is only where state and
federal law enforcement officials collide that concerns about waste of
scarce resources and usurpation of the state's criminal law enforce-
ment role arise. 293 Federal law enforcement officials possess far
greater resources than their state counterparts, and as in Miles, can
2a 1 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 143; Wyoming v. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239.
285 See, e.g., Wyoming v. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239; Node!, 452 U.S. at 293.
288 See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
287 Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 143,146, with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
288 See 397 U.S. at 143,146.
2°9 See./..apez, 514 U.S. at 552.
290 See supra notes 215-227 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 215-227 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 215-227 and accompanying text.
299 See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235,250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
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better afford the costs of interagency rivalry. 294 It is in those cases that
federal criminal jurisdiction most clearly intrudes upon state sover-
eignty.295
Although the Court rejected in New York v. United States the no-
tion that a state could "consent" to federal intrusion into state sover-
eignty, that case was not about the Tenth Amendment as an external
limit to the Commerce Clause, 256 Instead, that case addressed the abil-
ity of Congress to use a state's resources to implement a federal regu-
lation.297 By contrast, no state resources are'used in a federal criminal
prosecution; the defendant is indicted by a federal grand jury, and
prosecuted by a federal prosecutor in a federal court. Admittedly,
state acquiescence in federal criminal prosecutions might present
some of the same federalism issues that state consent did in New York
v. United States. 298 Arguably, the Constitution describes a precise line of
demarcation between state and federal power, and a breach of that
line would narrow state authority. 299 Under the National League of Cities
test—particularly if state acquiescence was taken into account—one
Hobbs Act prosecution for robbery might go forward, while a second
for a similar criminal act would not, because state officials preferred
to prosecute the case themselves. 500 Consent in this instance does not
narrow state criminal jurisdiction, however, because the state retains
the authority to indict and prosecute other criminals who violate state
law. 501
 Rigid lines of demarcation between state and federal power fail
to acknowledge the difficulty inherent to defining the limits of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority; as Justice Rehnquist warned in
Lopez, "[tjhese are not precise formulations, and in the nature of
things they cannot be."502
Though imprecise, a return to the test of National League of Cities
would reinforce one of the most important values embodied in the
Constitution: accountability of public officials to the local elector-
ate.803 Because they are elected, or appointed by officials elected solely
294 Cf. id.
295 Cf. id.
296 See505 U.S. at 160,182.
297 See id. at 160.
29° Cf. id. at 182.
299 See id. at 182.
300 See id.
" Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. al 182.
3°2 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. •
3°3 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); New Thrk v. United States,
505 U.S. at 168.	 .
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by the people within the jurisdiction, state attorneys general are far more
accountable to the people in their states. 304 By contrast, federal prose-
cutors are far less accountable for their acts." 5 If the electorate within
a state seeks to hold a federal prosecutor accountable for an unpopu-
lar law enforcement decision within a jurisdiction, their only recourse
is to demand that the President remove the U.S. Attorney, or vote
against the President of the United States in the next election." 6 In
either event, their ability to influence a federal criminal prosecutor is
entirely controlled by an official beholden not only to them, but to
the citizens of forty-nine other states for his or her position." 7
A return to National League of Cities and adoption of state acquies-
cence as a rebuttal to the presumption against federal criminal prose-
cutions would provide that accountability. It is helpful to consider the
contrast between the Boston Plan and Miles in this regard. 308 In a fed-
eral prosecution of a defendant identified by the YVSF through the
Boston Plan and charged with a Hobbs Act robbery, the Massachusetts
Attorney General might file a short brief with the federal district court
signaling that state's acquiescence in the prosecution. 309 The federal
district court would find that, in that case, federal prosecution did not
unduly interfere with state sovereignty and allow the trial to go for-
ward. 510 If the people of Massachusetts do not like the targeting of
youths for federal prosecution, they need look no further than their
Attorney General to hold an official ultimately accountable. 311 In the
Miles case, on the other hand, the Texas Attorney General, in consul-
tation with the Cooke County District Attorney, might refuse to acqui-
esce in the federal prosecution of the Hobbs Act robbery charge, be-
cause the state has already invested resources into the investigation of
the critne. 312 The federal district court would then weigh the sover-
eignty interest of the state—presumed to be high—against the na-
tional interest in the prosecution of two thugs who stole a few hun-
dred dollars from local restaurants—arguably quite lows"
504 See supw notes 215-236 and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 215-236 and accompanying text.
306 See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (c) (1994).
307
308 Compare Privor, supra note 215, at 476-77, with Miles, 122 F.3t1 at 250 (DeMoss,
specially concurring).
309 See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
sit See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
3t2 See Miles, 122 F.3d at 250 (DeMoss, J. specially concurring).
313 See supra notes 77-132 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Dormant Commerce Clause protects federal power over in-
terstate commerce from interference by state regulation of intrastate
commerce. 314
 The Court confronts similar issues when it addresses
federal criminal statutes which regulate areas of traditional state con-
trol, like arson, murder, rape and theft. 515 Rather than invalidate fed-
eral criminal statutes as facially unconstitutional, perhaps the Court
should square the external limit the Tenth Amendment imposes
upon Congress's Commerce Clause authority with the limit the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause imposes upon the states. 316 A balancing test
that weighed the interference of a federal criminal statute with an
area of traditional state control against the national benefit to be de-
rived would protect state sovereignty while providing states and the
national government maximum flexibility in dealing with crime con-
trol problems.s" Such an arrangement also would allow the people in
their states to check the excesses of unelected federal prosecutors
through their state law enforcement officials, and hold those law en-
forcement officials accountable for policy decisions made within the
state. 318
BRANDON L. BIGELOW
34 See supra notes 16-76 and accompanying text,
313 See supra notes 77-236 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 237-313 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 237-313 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 237-313 and accompanying text.
